A Covert Channel Using Named Resources by Davis, Joshua & Frost, Victor S.
A Covert Channel Using Named Resources
Joshua Davis
Email: namecc@covert.codes
Victor S. Frost
University of Kansas
Email: frost@ku.edu
Abstract—A network covert channel is created that uses
resource names such as addresses to convey information, and
that approximates typical user behavior in order to blend in
with its environment. The channel correlates available resource
names with a user defined code-space, and transmits its covert
message by selectively accessing resources associated with the
message codes. In this paper we focus on an implementation of
the channel using the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) with
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) as the message names, though
the system can be used in conjunction with a variety of protocols.
The covert channel does not modify expected protocol structure
as might be detected by simple inspection, and our HTTP
implementation emulates transaction level web user behavior in
order to avoid detection by statistical or behavioral analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Covert channels are essentially inter-process communi-
cation mechanisms designed to evade security systems that
may otherwise monitor or prevent communication between the
endpoint processes. Network covert channels have existed for
decades [9], and have increased in complexity, diversity, and
capability over time [2], [14], [15], [5]. As these channels
advanced, so did technology used to detect or disrupt them
[7], [17], [3], [4], [6], [8], and whereas early network covert
channels may have operated, for example, by simply placing
data in unused header fields, the requisite cleverness necessary
to remain undetected in security-intensive environments has
increased substantially over time.
Covert channels are used when legitimate communication
between the desired endpoint processes is forbidden, e.g.
through security mechanisms. They are also used when the
existence of the communication should be kept secret. This
is in contrast to typical methods of securing communication,
like cryptography, where the existence of the communication
is known, even if the nature of the message is not. When
designing a covert channel, the developer should keep this
in mind, and assume that the legitimate channel over which
the covert channel operates is under scrutiny. So, covert
channels aim to allow clandestine, secure communication over
an otherwise secured and scrutinized resource.
Network covert channels may be classified as storage based
or timing based. Storage based covert channels convey their
message by altering part of the legitimate (henceforth carrier)
communications data. Examples include the aforementioned
direct insertion data into an unused or unimportant header
field, and the modulation of header fields such as the TCP
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) [10]. Timing based covert
channels communicate by modulating some aspect of the
carrier communication’s timing. For example, the length of
the inter-packet delay (also known as packet inter-arrival time)
may be modulated [3], with timing variations conveying the
covert message. Detection of storage based network covert
channels relies on the identification of abnormalities in pro-
tocol structure or content. Detection of timing based network
covert channels generally relies on statistical analysis of the
carrier communication’s timing attributes [3], [4].
In this paper we introduce a network covert channel that
does not rely on content or protocol-level timing modification
of the carrier to send its data, but instead controls the order
of named resource accesses to send its message. As such, we
classify it as a zero-modification storage based network covert
channel. Our work makes the following contributions to covert
channel technology:
Covert transmission of data through access ordering.
Whereas traditional network storage based covert channels
convey data by changing or adding information to the carrier
communication, and typical timing based covert channels
operate by modifying the carrier’s protocol-level timing, our
channel does not modify the carrier content or protocol level
timing attributes. Instead, it modulates the order of normal,
unmodified resource accesses to send its covert message.
Transaction-level timing modulation for user behavior
emulation. Timing based covert channels traditionally modify
timing attributes that are associated with a deterministic state
machine such as a protocol stack. As such, statistical based
detection of such channels may be quite effective. Our channel,
as implemented in this paper, modifies transaction level timing.
In our case, this is the time between web resource accesses.
Transaction level timing is highly dependent on resource con-
tent and on the subjective user. We can take advantage of this
non-deterministic timing structure to effectively emulate user
behavior on interactive protocols, avoiding detection through
statistical, and in large part behavioral, analysis.
Following this introduction we will proceed to describe the
foundational concepts underlying our network covert channel,
such as the concept of named resources and the mechanisms of
the channel itself. Included in that description is an overview
of our use of transaction timing modulation to emulate user
behavior. Following that, we will outline our web based
implementation of the channel, which uses URLs to transmit
its covert message. While our channel is flexible and usable
on diverse protocols, we chose an HTTP, or web browsing
scenario due to the ubiquity and often innocuous appearance of
web associated protocols in a typical network. These qualities
make web protocols excellent camouflage protocols for our
channel. Following the description of our implementation we
will analyze the channel in terms of speed and effectiveness,
and finally finish by stating our suggestions for future work,
and conclusions.
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II. A COVERT CHANNEL BASED ON RESOURCE NAMES
A. Named Resources
Foundational to our covert channel is the concept of
named resources. Names may be considered an extension of
addresses, generalized to include things that are not necessarily
required to access the desired resource, or are not ordinarily
considered part of a resource’s address proper. Some examples
of names, in the context of this paper, are:
http://www.example.org/resource.html
https://example.com/search.php?id=A03F6
smb://fileserver/file.txt
Names exist whether or not they identify or address a
resource. They may be considered separable and could be
utilized in piecemeal, if that is helpful. Names may contain
data that identifies a resource, appended with invalid or even
nonsensical components. In our second example above, id may
or not meaningfully associate with the resource search.php,
but exists as part of the name regardless. Further, search.php
may not actually point to a resource when combined with
the given protocol and host. Names are ubiquitous, existing
across protocols and protocol stack layers. Note that addresses
are a subset of names, in our usage of the term. While we
will not make full use of all the attributes of names here, we
point them out so that those who might desire to implement a
version of our covert channel, perhaps on another protocol, will
understand that constraints involving addresses may be ignored
when doing so enhances the channel and does not result in
enhanced probability of detection by security mechanisms.
Named resource are, of course, resources whose identity
(location, etc.) is described by a name. Our abstraction of
names allow our channel to be utilized in a variety of environ-
ments on many different layers of a protocol stack. Though we
use URLs as the information bearing names in our implemen-
tation here, physical addresses on an 802.11 network, Object
Identifiers (OIDs) on a Simple Network Management Protocol
(SNMP) server, and many other protocols may conceivably
carry information using our covert channel technique. The
important consideration is that the channel should make use of
a protocol that allows it to effectively, and most of all securely,
communicate in its own particular environment.
It is worthwhile to make mention of the Named Data
Networking (NDN) project, a potential candidate for next
generation Internet [1]. In the NDN philosophy, everything,
down to pieces of content like sections of a video clip, has
a name. So it seems that even next generation networks will
be amicable to our covert channel, even more so than today’s
networks.
B. Formulating a Code-Space from Names
To convey information using a sequence of names, avail-
able names must be associated with codes from a code-space.
A code-space in this paper is simply a list of codes available
to the transmitter. A simple channel may well make due with
a small code-space, consisting, for example, of the lowercase
letters a-z, numbers 0-9, and a space character. Such a channel
would be said to have a code-space length of 37. It may be
occasionally necessary to transmit arbitrary binary data such as
images, scanned documents, or executables. To accommodate
such a scenario a code-space of length 256 might be used,
with each code representing a unique 8-bit byte. Like the
selection of protocol, code-space length is an implementation
consideration that is dependent on the particular scenario.
Our channel transmits its covert message by mapping its
available names to its desired code-space, and accessing the
names in the order required to convey the codes in the message.
It follows that there is a minimum number of names to which
the transmitter must have access in order to function. To main-
tain the behavioral constraints likely to be required of most
secure implementations, the names will need to blend in with
normal traffic of the type used in the channel. For example,
in a web based implementation, URLs must be valid, in part
so that the transmitter’s HTTP query will go off-site (and be
seen by the cleverly placed receiver), and in part so that our
transactions do not call attention to themselves. Theoretically,
one could utilize the same web resource with different postfixes
(e.g. ?id=[random]) to allow for an arbitrarily large code-
space. However, such behavior deviates far from what may be
expected from a normal web browsing session, and should be
avoided. The number of names available to the transmitter must
be sufficiently high to allow for the code-space to be saturated
(i.e. each code has corresponding URLs), and as mapping over
a finite code-space may result in uneven mapping, where more
URLs map to one code than another, the total number of
URLs available to the transmitter should be higher than the
number of codes in the code-space. This is also practical from
a behavioral emulation standpoint: repeatedly accessing the
same set of resources is unnatural browsing behavior.
It is also possible to transmit more than one code per trans-
action (e.g. web page access). As we will see, this significantly
improves the data-rate of our channel. However, increasing
the number of codes per transaction significantly increases
the number of names required. The relationship between the
minimum number of unique names required of the transmitter,
n, the code-space length, l, and the number of codes sent per
transaction, c, is given in Equation 1. This is a minimum
number because, as we have stated, we will require many
more codes if we must adhere to a non-repetitive, behaviorally
constrained series of transactions in our transmitter. Also,
while each name will only associate with one code from the
code-space, names do not naturally evenly distribute among
the code-space, so frequently more than n names are required
to ensure that every code has associated names.
n = lc (1)
We define a code list as a data structure that stores the
list of names associated with a particular code. To evenly
distribute the available names over the code-space, we hash the
names before assigning them to a code list. While the unhashed
name is kept in the list, the hash is used in assignment. The
transmitter can make the association between hash (and thus
name) and code by, for example, taking the first couple of
bytes from the hash, and limiting their maximum value to the
code-space length using a modulo operation. Tables 1 and 2
show an example of such a procedure. In this case the first
two bytes of the hash are taken, allowing two codes of length
256 to be sent per transaction.
Sending one of 256 codes per transaction requires a mini-
mum of 256 unique names, minimum because of the possibility
of more than one name mapping to one code. Sending two
codes per transaction requires at least 2562 = 65, 536 unique
names. Three codes per transaction requires at least 2563 =
16, 777, 216 unique names. We can see that a smaller code-
space implies more efficient channel operation: less names are
required to saturate the code lists, or alternatively the same
number of names can be used to allow for more than one
code to be sent per transaction. In our web based imple-
mentation, sending two codes per transaction is the practical
maximum. To send three codes per transaction requires that a
minimum of 2563 URLs be harvested to seed the transmitter.
Such harvesting would be temporally prohibitive. Even with
a lower number of names needed for transmission, obtaining
an adequate number may prove challenging. We have created
(and implemented) an effective solution to this problem in
our web based channel. A daemon, running continuously in
the background on the user’s machine (or another machine, if
appropriate) collects URLs as the user browses the web. Each
returned page is examined and links to pages (e.g. links leading
to resources ending in .php, .html, etc.) are recorded. When
the transmitter is ready to transmit its message, it takes the
list of names from the daemon (which in our case collected
upwards of 900 unique links per hour the user was actively
browsing), and uses that list in the formulation of the code-
space. Since the daemon is always running, the list of available
names continuously grows, and transmitting with bigger code-
spaces and more codes per transaction becomes easier as time
goes on.
C. Transmitter and Receiver Operation
Once the transmitter has been primed, that is, once it has
a sufficient number of names available to transmit its covert
message, it can begin transmitting. Once the transmitter is
ready, it will transmit as follows. Every c codes from the
message is taken at a time, c being the number of codes
sent per transaction. A name is selected from the code list
associated with the code (or codes if c > 1). The selection
may be random, as in our simple web based implementation,
or adhere to necessary behavioral constraints. The transmitter
simply accesses the name in the typical way (e.g. HTTP GET
for a web page), and continues the process until the entire
message has been sent.
A universal assumption among covert channels is that
the receiver must have eventual access (physical or logical)
to the data the transmitter has sent that is relevant to the
covert channel. In our web implementation, the covert channel
receiver is normally not the destination of the transmitter’s
HTTP requests (though such an arrangement would make
the receiver’s requirement of obtaining the transmitter’s web
traffic easier). As such, the transmitter is accessing web
resources at diverse locations, for example, from different
web servers. In this case, the receiver should have access to
the transmitter’s transmission medium at some point before
the traffic is separated according to destination. Given the
physical and logical securities in place around many networks
(locked communication closets, IPSEC between sites, and so
on), realization of this caveat can prove daunting.
While there is no particular method that users of network
covert channels employ to give the receiver access to the
transmitter’s communications, we can provide some potential
scenarios as examples. In the case of corporate or government
entities, that have lawful or de facto control over the com-
munication infrastructure of organizations that handle trans-
mitter traffic, intercepting the transmitter’s communications is
a matter of exercising authority. This is particularly relevant
as covert channels are reserved for the most secret communi-
cations, when even the existence of the communication is to
be hidden. So, in this first example, subversive agencies may
have illicit access to telecommunications infrastructure, and the
transmitter need only innocuously browse the web (in a loose
deterministic fashion) in order to securely pass information
to them. Our technique is extensible to other protocols (a
few possibilities may include certain remote file access and
torrent protocols), so systems with protocol attributes that
are inherently public could also provide the receiver with
access to the covert transmitter’s communications. Finally, the
transmission medium itself may be a broadcast domain, as
may be the case in certain radio based systems. For another,
published example of how our system might be integrated, see
[9].
The receiver requires limited knowledge in order to recover
the message from the transmitter’s transactions. These are, the
hash algorithm used on the names, and the mapping between
the hash and the code-space. The receiver does not need to
make assumptions regarding what names are available to the
transmitter. It simply takes note of the names accessed by
the transmitter (and their temporal order), hashes them, and
correlates the resulting hash to the code-space (similar to what
we saw in Tables 1 and 2.) The decoding can of course be done
in real-time or offline (for example, by parsing a tcpdump pcap
file with the transmitter’s traffic.)
The transmitter and receiver may coordinate the beginning
and end of a covert message transmission by a special sequence
of codes or by the use of a pre-shared delineation name (e.g.
URL). Using a sequence of codes to delineate the message will
require more time than using a delineation name, as multiple
codes must be transmitted. Using a reserved name to mark
the end of a transmission may have security implications. For
example, if the transmitter and receiver agree that a certain
name marks the end of a transmission, this name may not be
used during the transmission of the message without causing
the receiver to prematurely determine that the message has
ended. Using this reserved name (or names) at only the begin-
ning and end of the message may have security implications
as well, as the content of the name may deviate from what the
user is otherwise accessing, and the occurrence of an isolated
name among names that are otherwise related (by content or
link structure, for example) may be suspicious. If unrelated
traffic exists in the transmitter’s message stream (for example,
if the transmitting user is browsing the web at the same time
the message is being transmitted), similar techniques may be
used to differentiate the message traffic from the transmitter’s
browsing. If such a technique is used in the web browsing
channel implemented here, additional security concerns arise,
as the behavioral and timing constraints enforced by the
URL Hash Byte
http://www.example.com/news-1.html 155b1b1ef2eb1781147a97d07ce5c8d298a32d29 15
http://www.example.com/news-2.html 2bf66e1e1e70fd41e7f2633f71af6819c4783c91 2b
http://www.example.com/aboutus.html d742191535719fece50a8fb7857910a554a4ac0a d7
http://www.example.com/news-3.html 5125b8d9c5f6c338d9ec0bbe952db8a676886f63 51
http://www.example.com/news-4.html a3825d044dba76a89f6a11e1fae15bdcb6fbf0f7 a3
..... ..... .....
Table 1: Link to hash pairs
Byte to Code URL/character association
15 mod 25 http://www.example.com/news-1.html ↔ v
2b mod 25 http://www.example.com/news-2.html ↔ g
d7 mod 25 http://www.example.com/aboutus.html ↔ 4
51 mod 25 http://www.example.com/news-3.html ↔ h
a3 mod 25 http://www.example.com/news-4.html ↔ p
..... .....
Table 2: Hash to character pairs
channel for security may be negated by the additional pages
the user accesses.
D. Modeling User Behavior
If the channel’s underlying protocol allows for rapid ac-
cesses of resources, our channel can be quite fast. Unfortu-
nately, when user interactive protocols are involved, such as is
the case with a web browsing based channel, the time between
transactions (read-time) may be high. In those cases it is
not appropriate, from a behavioral emulation perspective, that
the transmitter simply access the relevant named resources in
sequence without consideration for the natural inter-transaction
delay that would occur if a user were actually interacting with
those resources. The covert channel must emulate this delay,
to satisfy some degree of behavioral security.
As our channel implementation below uses web resource
access to convey its message, we will focus on the timing
considerations involved in a web browsing scenario. In web
browsing, the read-time is loosely related to the content of the
retrieved resource. Videos take a while to watch, and games
take a while to play. But, users do not always watch the entire
video, or finish the game. In the case of text base resources,
the user may be interested in a long piece of text, and spend a
significant amount of time reading it, or they may be bored by
it and click away to another page soon after access. Such dy-
namics mean that web browsing inter-transaction delays (read-
times) are partially, though not entirely, non-deterministic. The
authors of [12] have found that user web read-time can be mod-
eled with some degree of success by examining page attributes
such as keyword content, word count, and page geometry, and
using this information to formulate a Weibull distribution, from
which realistic read-times may be selected. For tractability,
we utilize a simpler approach to determining read-time in
our experimental implementation: an exponential distribution
(which is a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of one,
and the additional quality of memorylessness), and a formula
provided by the Nielsen Corporation that allows us to estimate
an average user’s read-time when given page word count [16].
The Nielsen equation is shown in Equation 2, where tavg
is the average read-time, and w is the number of relevant
words. We consider words that are not part of HTML or
code (e.g. JavaScript) as relevant. We use this average to build
an exponential distribution from which to select our pseudo-
random read-times.
tavg = 0.44w + 25 (2)
The actual read-time we use in our implementation is
taken from a random-exponential distribution that uses tavg
as the distribution average. A uniformly distributed pseudo-
random variable u is generated after each transaction and
is used in conjunction with the distribution to formulate a
read-time, as shown in Equation 3. We refer to the read-
time generation model that employs Equations 2 and 3 as the
random-exponential model.
tread = −tavg ln(1− u) (3)
By using the random-exponential read-time model in con-
junction with the covert channel’s accessed resources, we are
able to approximate an average web user’s behavior from a
timing standpoint, allowing our web implementation to blend
in, in an “average” way. It is more difficult to emulate a user’s
resource selection behavior, however. In our web implementa-
tion the transmitter accesses resources from the relevant code
lists pseudo-randomly. The result is a channel that is able
to transmit its message, and emulate a typical user from a
timing aspect, but is susceptible to behavioral analysis in terms
of resource access ordering. We have not yet implemented a
heuristic to approximate a reasonable resource access ordering,
though we have some begun limited investigation into the
subject. The two primary constraining factors determining
access ordering in the web browsing case are subject relevance,
and link structure relationship. The typical web browsing user’s
page accesses are sometimes related by subject, though not
always, and subject matter may be distributed across browser
tabs and content related to different subject matter accessed in
parallel [18]. Further, hyperlink structure is generally coherent;
that is, a link in resource A leads to resource B which leads
to resource C, regardless of the subject matter. Subject matter
of different sorts may be viewed on a news web page, for
example, with link structure leading the user from the news site
front page to the various unrelated articles. A search engine
may be used to build hyperlink structure of related subject
matter, where a few top level search results are opened in
parallel (emulating tabbed browsing), and these pages subse-
quently traversed. We have not made sufficient progress into
web resource access ordering behavior emulation to include
it in our implementation here. Our channel implementation is
sufficient for exposition of its motivating contributions, though
it could be improved upon by including access order behavior
emulation.
In short, the degree to which the covert channel is able to
emulate user behavior in terms of timing, content relevance,
and content ordering, determine the level of security of the
channel. Such behavioral constraints are protocol and scenario
dependent; we have discussed the considerations that relate to
the web browsing case. Further, keep in mind that imposing
restrictions on the channel’s access behavior may decrease its
data-rate, and increase the time required to prime the system,
as the set of available resources for each message code will
be constrained not only to those that are relevant by code, but
also relevant by resource content.
E. Data-rate
The data-rate of our covert channel depends on the number
of codes sent per transaction, and the time between trans-
actions. Generally, we can express code-rate as shown in
Equation 4, where r is the code-rate in codes per second,
K is the number of codes sent per transaction, d is the
sum of the network, protocol, and other natural latencies of
the system (in seconds), and tread is the read-time inserted
between transactions (also in seconds.) If an implementation is
using the random-exponential delay model already described,
tread is the same given in Equation 3. If read-time varies,
an average code-rate over a number of transactions T can be
expressed as shown in Equation 5.
For implementations using a binary code-space of 256
length, data-rate can also be measured in bits per second, (bps).
The bps analogues to Equations 4 and 5 are shown in Equations
6 and 7.
r =
K
d+ tread
(4)
ravg =
(K)(T )
T∑
n=1
d+ tread[n]
(5)
bps = 8
K
d+ tread
(6)
bpsavg = 8
(K)(T )
T∑
n=1
d+ tread[n]
(7)
Our web based channel used two read-time models in
testing: the random-exponential model already explained, and
a minimum time model that did not insert any intentional
delay between transactions. In the minimum time model, the
delay between transactions is composed entirely of system and
network delays. The tests involving the minimum time delay
model yielded much higher data-rates than those using the
random-exponential delay model. This emphasizes a typical
trade-off that exists in covert channel design and implementa-
tion: speed versus security. Whereas our minimum time model
gives faster data-rates, its unnatural access behavior makes
channels using it vulnerable to detection by even naive security
systems.
Though we do not explore the topic here, potential data-
rate improvements exist for our channel. These include running
multiple channels in parallel (perhaps using different protocols
to avoid compromising typical behavioral mechanics of any
one protocol), and combining our covert channel with other
covert channels. Of course, the security implications of such
hybrid channels should be well considered before real-world
implementation.
F. Detection
Security can be applied to communications by employing
technologies such as cryptography. Covert channels are used
when evading detection is the primary consideration: when
the very existence of the channel should remain a secret.
Techniques used to detect the existence of covert channels
have historically focused on behavioral and timing anomalies
induced by the channel [4] [10], with timing analysis generally
done at the protocol level [3] [6] [8] [13] [17]. As mentioned
before, our channel does not change any component of the
carrier data. As such traditional storage based covert channel
detection techniques do not apply to our channel. Also as
mentioned, since we do not change protocol level timing of the
carrier traffic, our channel is not detectable by typical timing
based covert channel detection techniques, which focus on
changes in the deterministic timing of protocol stat machines.
We may be deficient from a behavioral standpoint, if an
impetus to look for our channel, or those like it, exists.
For example, our inter-transaction read-times as generated by
our random-exponential read-time model emulate a “typical”
user. It is conceivable, though we believe at the moment
unlikely, that variance from the individual user’s read-time
behavior may be seen as suspicious. The under-explored topic
of user behavioral emulation in transaction ordering is our
most likely vulnerability to detection, though we know of no
work that has been done to date on this topic, and simple
behavioral emulation measures (such as the search engine
based technique mentioned above) is assumed to be adequate
for most situations.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
Our web-based implementation operates as follows. A
daemon runs continually on the user’s machine and observes
their web traffic. For each web resource accessed by the user,
the daemon unobtrusively parses the return HTML, adding to
its list of available resources (URLs). For each link that does
not already exist in one of its code lists, it assigns it to a list
as follows. First, it hashes the full URL using the SHA-1 hash
algorithm. Then, it takes the first two characters of the hash,
modulo the code-space size (which is variable), and assigns
the URL to a code list according to the result. This is similar
to the process shown in Tables 1 and 2. We select the first two
bytes of the hashes because the maximum code-space length
in our tests is 256, and the maximum number of codes per
transaction (i.e. codes per name) we send in the tests is two.
So, by using two bytes, each name can associate with up to one
of 2562 different codes (see Equation 1.) In our implementation
we ignore behavioral restrictions involving name relation, and
Fig. 1: Implementation Scenario
consider our channel ready to transmit after all relevant code
lists have associated URLs.
The transmitter component of our implementation is tun-
able in terms of code-space and number of codes sent per
transaction. It can use the random-exponential or minimum
time read-time delay models, also configurable by the user.
It receives its URL lists from the daemon, who continues
adding to its own lists even as the transmitter retrieves pages
during transmission. When directed to transmit the transmitter
will send its message c codes at a time, c being the number
of codes per transaction as configured for the particular test.
The transmitter continues accessing names until it has finished
sending its message. The transmitter and daemon were pro-
grammed in Python and ran on a Linux system (Fedora 20),
consisting of commodity hardware including an Intel i7-4960X
processor, 32GB of DRAM, and an Intel 82579V Gigabit
Ethernet controller. Both the daemon and transmitter were
programmed in Python.
In our implementation the receiver passively forwarded
traffic from the transmitter’s LAN to the LAN edge router (a
Cisco 2811), collecting traffic from the transmitter’s IP address
in a pcap file with tcpdump. After transmission, it decoded
the transmitter’s accesses using roughly the same method the
transmitter used to assign its names to code-space (Tables
1 and 2.) In our experiments the receiver ran on a small,
unobtrusive Raspberry Pi, such as might easily go unnoticed
hidden in a communications closet or above a dropped ceiling.
The Pi ran Raspbian Linux, and the receiver software was
coded in Python. For each test, both the transmitter and
receiver scripts were configured for the particular code-space
mapping. Aside from the hash algorithm and transmitter IP
address (so that it could sort the transmitter from the aggregate
communication stream), no further information was required
of the receiver to decode the message.
The topology of the test network is shown in Figure 1.
Note that the destination servers exist in diverse locations on
the Internet, and so their associated hardware and software are
variable.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Several tests were executed that allowed us to observe the
trade-offs between different system parameters in our system.
The parameters varied were message length (16, 32, and
64 bytes), code-space size (32, 128, and 255 codes), codes
per transaction (1 or 2 codes), and delay model (random-
exponential or minimum delay.) These parameters were chosen
as they illustrate the adaptability of the channel to different
scenarios (e.g. code-space lengths), and to better understand
how they each relate to channel performance. Forty tests were
run for configurations using the random-exponential read-time
model, 20 were run for those using the minimum delay model.
V. RESULTS
The results of the individual test configurations are shown
in Table 3, where the read-time model, given in the delay
column, is either MT for minimum time, or RE for random-
exponential. Unsurprisingly (and as mentioned before), the
read-time model has the most significant impact on the channel
performance. For those tests using the random-exponential
delay model, message length had minimal impact on the
channel speed, code-space length had minimal impact as well,
though increasing the number of codes sent per transaction
from one to two resulted in a substantial (about four-fold)
increase in data-rate. The extent to which the delay model had
an effect on channel data-rate is shown in Figure 2a. Figures
2b through 2d convey visually how message length, code-space
size, and codes per transaction affected channel rate, with both
delay models included in the calculations. Figures 3a through
3c show this same information taken from only the random
exponential read-time delay model tests.
VI. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
We have taken a novel approach to creating a network
covert channel that by its nature evades typical covert channel
detection techniques such as those that employ content anal-
ysis to detect storage based covert channels, and those that
use statistical analysis to detect timing based channels. Our
channel is flexible and may be implemented using arbitrary
protocols, as best suits the particular situation.
C.S. Len. Msg. Len. Codes / Hash Delay Avg. (bps) Std. Dev.
255 16 bytes 1 MT 3.61 14.10
255 16 bytes 1 RE 0.90 0.30
255 16 bytes 2 MT 2.94 20.41
255 16 bytes 2 RE 0.46 0.81
255 32 bytes 1 MT 2.92 10.07
255 32 bytes 1 RE 0.09 0.40
255 32 bytes 2 MT 11.23 14.75
255 32 bytes 2 RE 0.39 0.67
255 64 bytes 1 MT 3.12 15.27
255 64 bytes 1 RE 0.08 0.64
255 64 bytes 2 MT 14.57 69.00
255 64 bytes 2 RE 0.35 1.04
128 16 bytes 1 MT 3.23 15.94
128 16 bytes 1 RE 0.09 0.28
128 16 bytes 2 MT 11.78 26.40
128 16 bytes 2 RE 0.45 0.71
128 32 bytes 1 MT 3.29 15.67
128 32 bytes 1 RE 0.87 0.35
128 32 bytes 2 MT 12.67 40.38
128 32 bytes 2 RE 0.42 0.78
128 64 bytes 1 MT 2.80 6.47
128 64 bytes 1 RE 0.08 0.45
128 64 bytes 2 MT 16.47 70.62
128 64 bytes 2 RE 0.41 1.69
32 16 codes 1 MT 2.42 13.46
32 16 codes 1 RE 0.88 0.33
32 16 codes 2 MT 9.01 22.94
32 16 codes 2 RE 0.52 0.74
32 32 codes 1 MT 2.49 18.05
32 32 codes 1 RE 0.09 0.42
32 32 codes 2 MT 10.39 31.03
32 32 codes 2 RE 0.38 0.84
32 64 codes 1 MT 3.04 18.78
32 64 codes 1 RE 0.08 0.39
32 64 codes 2 MT 10.28 64.4
32 64 codes 2 RE 0.37 1.12
Table 3: Test Results
The most challenging aspect of this covert channel is user
behavior emulation for transaction selection. Not only should
resources be accessed in a natural way, but the number of
resources requires to make such natural accesses available
may be quite large. In the web case, filling the code lists
with enough URLs to avoid repetition may take a significant
amount of time (which is why we employ a daemon to
prime the system before and between transmissions); adding
the caveat that resources must be related (by content, or
hyperlink structure) increases the required number of resources
dramatically.
Research shown in [12], [11], and [18] demonstrate that
the Nielsen formula for computing average read-time based
on page word count is over simplified. To better emulate user
timing behavior, our channel would need to include the results
developed in those sources.
It is also worth looking into the viability of using other
protocols in our channel, as other protocols may be more
amicable to our channel concepts in certain environments. For
example, remote file access protocols such as Server Message
Block (SMB) or Network File System (NFS) protocols may
be natural carriers for our channel in certain environments.
(a) Avg. Rate by Delay Model (b) Avg. Rate by Message Length
(c) Avg. Rate by Code-Space Length (d) Avg. Rate by Codes per Transaction
Fig. 2: Average rates among all tests
(a) Avg. Rate by Message Length (Random Exp.) (b) Avg. Rate by Code-Space Length (Random
Exp.)
(c) Avg. Rate by Codes per Hash (Random Exp.)
Fig. 3: Average rates among random exponential delay model tests
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